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Normative models of choice in economics and biology usually expect preferences to be consistent across contexts, or
‘‘rational’’ in economic language. Following a large body of literature reporting economically irrational behaviour in
humans, breaches of rationality by animals have also been recently described. If proven systematic, these findings
would challenge long-standing biological approaches to behavioural theorising, and suggest that cognitive processes
similar to those claimed to cause irrationality in humans can also hinder optimality approaches to modelling animal
preferences. Critical differences between human and animal experiments have not, however, been sufficiently
acknowledged. While humans can be instructed conceptually about the choice problem, animals need to be trained by
repeated exposure to all contingencies. This exposure often leads to differences in state between treatments, hence
changing choices while preserving rationality. We report experiments with European starlings demonstrating that
apparent breaches of rationality can result from state-dependence. We show that adding an inferior alternative to a
choice set (a ‘‘decoy’’) affects choices, an effect previously interpreted as indicating irrationality. However, these effects
appear and disappear depending on whether state differences between choice contexts are present or not. These
results open the possibility that some expressions of maladaptive behaviour are due to oversights in the migration of
ideas between economics and biology, and suggest that key differences between human and nonhuman research must
be recognised if ideas are to safely travel between these fields.
Citation: Schuck-Paim C, Pompilio L, Kacelnik A (2004) State-dependent decisions cause apparent violations of rationality in animal choice. PLoS Biol 2(12): e402.
Introduction
The study of animal behaviour has often incorporated
concepts from economic theory. This was the case, for
instance, with the introduction of game theory to the study
of animal conﬂict (Maynard-Smith and Price 1973; Maynard-
Smith 1974). Similarly, optimal foraging theory (Charnov
1976; Stephens and Krebs 1986) was based on viewing animals
as maximisers, with utility often being replaced by rate of
energy gain as a proxy for Darwinian ﬁtness, and natural
selection playing the role of the short-sighted architect of the
decision mechanisms followed by individuals. The foundation
for this migration of ideas between ﬁelds is the notion that
optimal choice is deﬁned by the value of the consequences of
each option, and that this value is jointly determined by the
option’s properties and the chooser’s state. This is clear
within models, but presents considerable difﬁculties for
empirical tests, and we address some of these problems in
this paper.
One consequence of expecting individuals to behave as if
they maximised the expected value of a particular function
(say, inclusive ﬁtness) is captured in the economic concept of
rationality. Since ‘‘rationality’’ is used with very different
meanings in different ﬁelds (see Kacelnik [2004] for a
discussion of rationality and its meanings), it is important
to point out that here we will use the term only in its
economic sense. Rationality, in this restricted sense, encap-
sulates several principles that are necessary conditions for the
existence of a scale of value consistent across contexts (Mas-
Collel et al. 1995). Transitivity, for instance, is a hallmark of
rational choice theories. It states that if ‘‘a’’ is preferred to
‘‘b’’, and ‘‘b’’ to ‘‘c’’, then ‘‘a’’ should also be preferred over
‘‘c’’. If, say, ‘‘c’’ were to be preferred to ‘‘a’’, it would not be
possible to place the three options on an ordinal scale.
Another principle included in economic rationality is that of
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA; Arrow 1951),
namely, the expectation that preference between a pair of
options should be independent of the presence of inferior
alternatives. There are different versions of IIA, depending
on how demandingly one deﬁnes ‘‘preference’’. A strong
probabilistic version, known as the ‘‘constant-ratio rule’’
(Luce 1959), states that the relative proportion of choices
made between two options should be the same (as opposed to
merely maintaining the same order), regardless of whether
they are on their own (binary choices) or in the presence of a
third (less preferred) option (trinary choices). A weaker
version, known as ‘‘regularity’’, states that rationality is
violated if the proportion of choices for any preexisting
option is increased after the addition of a new alternative to
the choice set (Luce and Suppes 1965).
Breaches of rationality are well documented in observa-
tional or experimental studies on human choice (Tversky
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Pettibone 1996; Gigerenzer et al. 1999), and have forced a
reinterpretation of much of the existing data and models. In
many studies, these violations are taken to imply context-
dependent valuation, namely the notion that the (subjective)
value of each option is not determined only by its properties
and consequences, but instead is constructed at the moment
of choice as a function of the number and nature of other
options available—a ﬁnding used, for example, in marketing
and political campaigning for manipulating consumer pref-
erences through the strategic presentation of products and
candidates.
An alternative view (Kacelnik and Krebs 1997; Gigerenzer
et al. 1999) is that although these mechanisms can cause costly
choices, they (the mechanisms) are evolutionarily and/or
ecologically rational, meaning that on average in the
environment where they evolved or were individually
acquired they generate stochastically optimal outcomes.
Whichever the interpretation, however, locally costly devia-
tions from rationality do occur, and can offer signiﬁcant
insights in the development of theoretical models of decision-
making.
A number of psychological mechanisms have been pro-
posed to explain the effect of inferior alternatives on choice
and other examples of irrationality. According to them, the
observed failure to exhibit consistent preferences across
contexts would be attributable to the dependence of the
information-processing mechanisms used by individuals, or
of the heuristics used for making choices, on the nature of the
choice problem and available alternatives (Shaﬁr et al. 1989;
Wedell 1991; Payne et al. 1992). While normative micro-
economic theory is independent of process and focuses on
revealed preferences, these developments relate the theory to
cognition and give weight to the process by which agents
reach decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 2000).
It is worth remembering that consistency of preference is
accepted by all parties to be only relevant when constancy in
the state of the subjects and in the properties of the options is
assumed. A subject that prefers lamb to ice cream before
dinner, ice cream to coffee immediately after dinner, and
coffee to lamb a few minutes later is not considered to be
showing intransitivity or violating any principle of ration-
ality, because she is (trivially) changing state between the
choices. Similarly, a subject that takes a mango when
presented with a basket of many mangoes and only one
apple, but takes an apple when faced with equal numbers of
both fruits may not be considered irrational, because the
value of an option may change when it is the last one, as there
is a reputation cost of being impolite and taking the last
available fruit of any kind (Sen 1997). Many human experi-
ments are comparisons between groups of subjects that can
be assumed to be in equal states at the time of testing but, as
we shall see, this is often not ensured in nonhuman animals.
Violations of rationality by animals have also been
reported (Shaﬁr 1994; Hurly and Oseen 1999; Waite 2001a;
Bateson 2002; Bateson et al. 2002, 2003; Shaﬁr et al. 2002). If
these observations are corroborated and found to be
systematic, the predictive power of the normative approach
to animal behaviour should be questioned. Additionally, the
observation of similarly irrational behaviour by animal and
human subjects raises the possibility that the same cognitive
mechanisms or processes operate in both cases. In fact,
explanations for irrationality based on phenomena such as
regret and overconﬁdence (e.g., Loomes and Sugden 1982),
proposed with humans in mind, could be tested by examining
whether the same circumstances elicit the expression of the
same type of paradoxical behaviour in human and nonhuman
subjects. If they do, and the mechanisms seem unlikely to
operate in nonhuman agents, one may be advised to seek
alternative explanations that work well for all kinds of
subjects.
Although these possibilities make the study of rationality
valuable, critical procedural differences between the two
ﬁelds have not been sufﬁciently acknowledged. One crucial
distinction derives from the fact that, while human subjects
can be verbally instructed about the properties of the
alternatives, animals must be exposed to the contingencies
to experience or learn about them. This difference hinders
the comparison of the mechanisms underlying human and
animal choices, since repeated exposure to different contexts
often affects the organism’s state, thus removing the
justiﬁcation for expecting transitivity, regularity, or any
other principle of consistency. In the case of foraging
research, different contexts can alter the subjects’ net rate
of intake during training, so that at the time of choice the
resulting state differs and it may be unjustiﬁed to expect
consistency of preferences. The fact that optimal decisions
should be contingent upon state (Houston and McNamara
1999) has been indeed an essential part of normative
modelling in biology. As a consequence, apparent violations
of rational principles by animals could also result from
straightforward state-dependent optimality, the very frame-
work being questioned. It may be added that, although we
focus on changes in energetic state that could unwittingly be
caused by training, these are not the only possible state
consequences of instruction by exposure to the contingencies
during training. A subject may be in a different state if the
consumption of food items during training affects its nutri-
tional requirements for the achievement of a balanced diet in
future choice opportunities (Simpson and Raubenheimer
1993; Raubenheimer and Simpson 1997), or if changes in the
context of choice provide it with different information about
its future options (Houston 1997).
Here we further develop the basis upon which to compare
economic rationality between humans and nonhumans, and
test whether state-dependent decision-making can be respon-
sible for apparent violations of economic rationality in
animal choices. To this end, we compare the foraging
preferences of European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) between
members of a ﬁxed, focal pair of options across different
choice contexts. Our basic paradigm is deﬁned in Figure 1.
The members of the focal pair of options differed in that
while one of them (focal amount [FA]) offered a higher
amount of food, the other (focal delay [FD]) was associated
with a better (shorter) delay to food. These two attributes
(amount and delay) were counterbalanced between the focal
options so as to preserve their ratio (amount/delay), which is
known to be (other factors remaining the same) a strong
predictor of preference. A third option, or ‘‘decoy’’, was also
available during training and in some of the choice trials. The
decoy could be either decoy amount (DA) or decoy delay
(DD), depending on treatment (‘‘High Intake’’ and ‘‘Low
Intake’’ respectively, see Figure 1). We refer to the third
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org December 2004 | Volume 2 | Issue 12 | e402 2306
Economic Rationality in Animal Choicesoption as ‘‘decoy’’ because its ratio of amount to delay was
lower than in the focal options, and hence it is expected not
to be preferred over either (in economic nomenclature, the
decoys were ‘‘dominated’’ by the focal options). As postulated
by context-dependent (or ‘‘comparative’’) models of choice
(Shaﬁr et al. 1989, 1993; Wedell 1991; Tversky and Simonson
1993), a decoy can potentially affect preferences between a
pair of options whenever subjective values are assigned
comparatively, namely whenever an option’s subjective value
depends on the interaction of its properties with those of the
remaining alternatives in a set, as well as when the decoy
affects a subject’s perception of the choice problem. We thus
test whether each animal’s preference between the focal
options changes between two treatments that differed with
respect to which of the two decoys was present. To increase
comparability with previous research, the parameter values of
the decoys were chosen to maximise their putative effect
upon preference within the focal pair as postulated by
psychological models purported to explain irrational choice
(see Materials and Methods for details).
Figure 1 also shows that, although the two focal options and
the two decoys were equated in the ratio of amount to delay,
they were not equated in terms of their energetic con-
sequences. When all times in the cycle are included, the order
in terms of energetic rate of return (the slope of the broken
lines in Figure 1) is FA . DA . FD . DD. This means that
differences in energetic state as a consequence of training
with either of the two decoys could be a confounding factor
in interpreting putative differential effects of the decoys.
Speciﬁcally, repeated exposure to DA could lead to a higher
cumulative intake, hence changing choices due to the
expression of state-dependent preferences instead of the
use of a comparative cognitive mechanism of choice. Our
study is aimed at separating these possibilities.
We tested preference between the focal options under
three conditions: (1) treatments differing in energetic states
when the decoys are absent; (2) treatments differing in which
of the two decoys is present, when the energetic consequen-
ces caused by each decoy are not controlled; (3) treatments
differing in which decoy is present, when the energetic
differences they may cause are abolished by supplementary
feeding. Our rationale for this design is that if the effects of
the decoys are independent of their energetic consequences
(i.e., differences in preference between the treatments are
observed in all conditions), then these effects may indeed be
evidence for a comparative cognitive mechanism of valu-
ation, possibly caused by the same types of cognitive biases
and heuristics reported in the human literature. However, if
the effects of the decoys are abolished by controlling for
energetic consequences and are generated by imposing state
changes in the absence of decoys, it would be more
parsimonious to explain the effects as state-dependent




We started by testing whether the birds could discriminate
between the amounts of reward associated with each of the
foraging options shown in Figure 1 (there is already strong
evidence that they are able to discriminate between the delays
Figure 1. Amount and Delay to Food Corresponding to Each Option
The ﬁgure shows the parameters of the experiments using the
conventional representation used in foraging theory, with energy
gains in the ordinate and time in the abscissa. The origin of
coordinates is the point of choice, so that time to the right indicates
the delay between choice and reward, while time to the left represents
all other times in the cycle, in this case the ITI. The options forming
the focal choice pair are shown as white circles while those used as
decoys are shown by black circles. FA and FD offer the same short-
term rate of food intake (slope of the solid lines) of 0.5 units/s,
whereas DA and DD offer the same short-term rate of 0.25 units/s.
The slopes of the dashed lines (interrupted for space economy)
indicate long-term rate of intake, considering the inter-trial interval
of 60 s between consecutive feeding opportunities. ‘‘High intake’’
(horizontally adjacent rectangles) and ‘‘low intake’’ (vertically
adjacent rectangles) denote the treatments in which decoy DA and
DD (or their simulated energetic consequences), respectively, were
present in addition to the focal pair. Since DA offers a higher long-
term rate of gain than DD, intake is higher in the treatment where DA
is present (‘‘High Intake’’). The reverse rationale applies to treatment
‘‘Low Intake.’’
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.g001
Figure 2. Discrimination Test
Proportion of choices (6 standard error [s.e.]) made by birds for the
option offering the largest amount of food when time parameters
were held constant. Choice proportions are signiﬁcantly different
from random for all birds (binomial test, p , 0.01). Birds 1, 2, and 3
(white bars) were presented with choices between one and two units
of food, and birds 4, 5, and 6 (black bars) with choices between two
and ﬁve units of food.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.g002
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choices of each bird to the option offering the largest amount
of food. All birds in both groups signiﬁcantly preferred the
option offering the larger amount (binomial tests, p , 0.01 in
all cases), conﬁrming that the birds discriminate between
these amounts.
Effects of Intake Rate without Decoys
The proportion of choices made for each focal option in
the absence of decoys when energetic state was manipulated
experimentally is shown in Figure 3A. Although the purpose
of this experiment was to examine how the strength of
preference between the focal options was affected by differ-
ences in energetic state, it is worth pointing out that there
was an overall preference for FA (the option with higher
long-term rate of gain) over FD even though the ratio of
amount to delay was the same for both options. This
preference for FA is not caused by the accumulated energetic
consequences of exposure to each option, because the two
focal options were experienced in mixed sessions. In Mazur’s
(1987) ‘‘hyperbolic’’ model, which is widely used in the
behavioural analysis literature, the time between feeding
events (or inter-trial interval [ITI]) is not included, but
instead a constant with the value of 1 s is added to the delay in
the denominator. The effect of this term is also to make the
value of FA higher than that of FD, consistent with the
observed trend.
The critical observation for the present purposes, however,
is that the magnitude of the preference between the focal
options differed signiﬁcantly between intake treatments.
Speciﬁcally, preference for FA over FD was higher in
treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ (the treatment with lower accumu-
lated intake) than in treatment ‘‘High Intake’’ (F1,8 = 12.1, p
, 0.008; Figure 3A). The details of the supplementary feeding
are given in Materials and Methods, but it is important to
highlight that the difference in supplementary intake
between treatments ‘‘High Intake’’ and ‘‘Low Intake’’ simu-
lated the differences in state that would be consequent on
repeated experience of decoys DA and DD, respectively.
These results thus show that energetic state per se can
directly affect the strength of preference between alterna-
tives.
The stability criteria (see Materials and Methods) were
reached by all but one bird. We therefore also conducted the
analysis excluding this bird. The results were the same:
Preference for FA over FD was signiﬁcantly higher in
treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ than in treatment ‘‘High Intake’’
(F1, 7 = 18.9, p=0.003).
Test of Economic Rationality in the Presence and Absence
of Controls for Intake
In this experiment, two groups of six starlings each (group
C had intake controlled between treatments, and NC had
intake not controlled between treatments) were trained with
three options (the two focal options and one of the decoys)
and then allowed to choose between either two (binary trials)
or three (trinary trials) of those options. The two treatments,
‘‘High Intake’’ and ‘‘Low Intake’’, differed in which of the two
decoys (DA and DD, respectively) was present during training
and in the trinary choices. Within each group, every subject
experienced both treatments.
Considering the results of the previous experiment,
preference for FA over FD should be higher in the treatment
with lower accumulated intake (treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’) for
group NC, in which such intake differences were not
eliminated. No differences should, however, be observed in
group C, in which intake differences were abolished. The
results from the binary choice trials (where only the focal
options were present) are shown in Figures 3B and 3C. As
predicted, for group NC, preference for FA tended to be
higher in treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ (F1,4 = 7.4, p = 0.06; Figure
3B). In group C, intake differences resulting from the decoys
were abolished by supplementary feeding, and no differences
in preference between treatments were detected (F1,4 = 0.2, p
= 0.677; Figure 3C). To summarise, differences in the level of
preference for the focal options in binary choices are present
when intake differs but there are no decoys (Figure 3A) and
when decoys are present and their intake consequences are
Figure 3. Individual Proportion of Choices for FA Relative to FD in
Treatments ‘‘High Intake’’ and ‘‘Low Intake’’
(A) Effect of intake on choices without decoys. Here, extra food
simulates the intake consequences that the two decoys cause when
they are present and consumed on 25% of the feeding opportunities
(p , 0.01).
(B) Results of an experiment with decoys when energetic consequen-
ces of the decoys were allowed to take effect (group NC) (p = 0.06).
(C) Results of an experiment with decoys, similar to (B), in which the
energetic consequences of the decoys were abolished (group C).
In (B) and (C), each symbol corresponds to each of the subjects. The
dashed lines show the mean values in each of the cases.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.g003
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present but their intake consequences are neutralised (Figure
3C).
We also analysed the temporal aspects of state changes on
choice. Because the long-term rate of gain offered by DA was
higher than that offered by DD, in group NC the difference in
cumulative intake between the ‘‘High Intake’’ and ‘‘Low
Intake’’ treatments must have increased over the trials in a
session. Accordingly, the rate of increase in the strength of
preference for FA over FD along the trials (as measured by
the slope of the regression of trial number against average
proportion of choices for FA) was signiﬁcantly higher in the
latter than in the former treatment (group NC: F1,4 = 27.35, p
= 0.006). This difference was not observed for the group in
which intake was controlled (group C: F1,4 = 1.29, p = 0.32).
The rational principle of regularity and the constant-ratio
rule can be examined by comparing choices between the focal
options in binary (only the two focal options present) versus
trinary (two focal options and one decoy) trials (see details in
Data Analysis). We make two types of comparisons, between-
treatments and within-treatments. In the between-treatments
comparison we compare the binary trials of one treatment
with the trinary trials of the other. For example, we compare
the binary trials of treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ (when training
included exposure to FA, FD, and DD, but choices were
between FA and FD presented alone) against the trinary trials
of treatment ‘‘High Intake’’ (when training included FA, FD,
and DA, and choices were between FA, FD, and DA), and vice
versa. In the within-treatments comparisons, we compare
binary versus trinary trials within the same treatment (e.g.,
binary versus trinary trials of treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ and
binary versus trinary trials of treatment ‘‘High Intake’’).
Notice that within a given treatment (within-treatment
comparisons), accumulated intake was the same in binary
and trinary trials for both groups of subjects (C and NC),
whereas between treatments (between-treatment compari-
sons), accumulated intake differed between binary and
trinary trials for the group of subjects in which intake
differences were not controlled (NC). Therefore, if intake,
rather than purely cognitive effects, is the cause of changes in
preference for the focal options, apparent violations of
regularity and of the constant-ratio rule should be observed
only in the between-treatments comparisons for group NC.
Conversely, if the presence of the decoys has a cognitive
effect upon preferences that is independent of state, such
violations should be observed both in the between- and
within-treatments comparisons. Table 1 lists the predicted
direction of preferences for each of the treatments, consid-
ering the hypothesis that differences in intake generated by
exposure to the decoys, rather than purely cognitive effects of
the decoys, cause the apparent violations of rationality. The
directions of preferences were predicted on the basis of the
results of the experiment without decoys, which showed that
preference for FA was higher in the treatment with lower
accumulated intake. Hence, we expect preference for FA to
be higher in treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’; namely, we expect
P(FA[‘‘Low Intake’’]) . P(FA[‘‘High Intake’’]), and conse-
quently, P(FD[‘‘Low Intake’’]) , P(FD[‘‘High Intake’’]), where
P is the strength of preference for the corresponding focal
option in the relevant treatment. For simplicity, only the
predictions for group NC are shown in Table 1, since under
the energetic hypothesis we do not expect differences in
preference levels (and therefore violations of rationality) for
the group in which intake differences were abolished (group
C).
Figures 4 and 5 show the results for the between- and
within-treatments comparisons, respectively. The left panels
in both ﬁgures show the results for group NC (Figures 4A, 4C,
5A, and 5C) and the right panels for group C (Figures 4B, 4D,
5B, and 5D). No violations of either regularity or differences
in relative choice proportions were observed in group C
(repeated-measures ANOVA, all p . 0.1). For group NC, the
observed directions of preferences were, in all cases,
consistent with all predictions shown in Table 1. In terms of
the signiﬁcance of the observed changes in preference in the
between-treatment comparisons (Figure 4A and 4C), one out
of the two predicted apparent violations of regularity was
statistically signiﬁcant: There was a signiﬁcant increase in the
absolute proportion of choices for an option (FD) in the
trinary with respect to the binary context (F1,4 = 7.8, p =
0.049; Figure 4A). The constant-ratio rule (see Data Analysis
in Materials and Methods) was also violated as predicted in
Figure 4. Between-Treatments Comparison in Binary and Trinary Choice
Trials
The bars show the mean (6 s.e.) absolute (FD and FA: leftmost and
centre pairs of columns in each panel, respectively) and relative (FA*:
rightmost pair of columns in each panel) proportion of choices for
each option in binary (white bars) and trinary (black bars) trials when
intake rate is not controlled (group NC: A and C; white background)
or is controlled (group C: B and D; grey background). Relative
preferences were calculated using equation 1 (see text). We compared
the preference between the same two focal options between the
binary context of one treatment (e.g., treatment ‘‘High Intake’’) and
the trinary of the other (e.g., treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’). In group C (B
and D), none of the differences between binary and trinary contexts
were statistically signiﬁcant. For group NC (A and C), the asterisk (*)
indicates a signiﬁcant violation of either regularity or the constant-
ratio rule at p , 0.05.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.g004
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signiﬁcantly higher in the binary than in the trinary context
(F1,4 = 9.2, p = 0.039; Figure 4A). Finally, against the
hypothesis that the effect of decoys on preferences were
caused by purely cognitive processes of comparison, there
were no signiﬁcant differences in preferences in the within-
treatments comparisons of binary versus trinary trials
(repeated-measures ANOVA, all p . 0.1; Figure 5A and 5C).
The presence of apparent violations when the effect of the
decoys on intake was allowed and their absence when the
effect was abolished was again consistent with the hypothesis
that these apparent irrationalities were caused by differences
in intake brought about by exposure to the decoys. The
hypothesis is further conﬁrmed by the absence (both for the
group that received supplementary feeding and the one that
did not receive it) of violations in the within-treatment
comparisons, when the cognitive effect of the decoys was
allowed but state was neutralised.
In group NC, all birds reached the stability criteria. In
group C, however, one bird did not reach the criteria in
treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’, and another did not reach stability
in treatment ‘‘High Intake’’. We therefore reanalysed the data
for this group excluding these two birds. The results were the
same, namely, in none of the tests for this group was
rationality breached.
Discussion
Our aim in this study was to foster the development of a
solid interdisciplinary basis upon which to compare research
on economic rationality in humans and nonhumans, and to
investigate whether normatively inspired hypotheses of
animal behaviour may be systematically misleading, as they
implicitly assume rationality. To this end, we examined
whether violations of economic rationality in animals that
have recently been reported in the literature represent real
violations of rationality caused by the use of comparative
cognitive mechanisms of choice as proposed for humans or,
alternatively, to unwittingly imposed differences in the state
of the subjects. To do this requires testing whether one can
reproduce the reported breaches of rationality and whether
they are abolished when cognitive effects are allowed but
state differences are eliminated. A further test requires
generating such violations by changes of state alone. We
have achieved all of these conditions in our experiments.
Why should preferences be modulated by energetic state?
To start dealing with this question, it is necessary to start by
considering why choices do not go exclusively to the option
with maximum value. From an evolutionary perspective, one
possibility is that subjects are adapted to some level of
ambiguity (for instance, because the properties of options
may change with time), and tracking these properties requires
some level of response to each available option (Houston et
al. 1982). If partial preferences are taken as a given, the next
stage is to model the factors that may affect them
quantitatively. Here, it is possible that partial preferences
depend on the beneﬁts that could be derived from each of the
available options and that these beneﬁts depend on the state
of the subject. To capture this possibility, the probability of
choosing a suboptimal action (in this case FD, which offers a
poorer long-term rate of gain) could be modelled as a
function of the difference between the beneﬁt accruing from
each option while the subject is in a given state. For example,
inspired by the ‘‘matching law’’ from behavioural analysis
(Herrnstein 1961), Kacelnik (1984) tested the ﬁt of a model
termed ‘‘proﬁtability matching’’ for starlings experiencing
the conditions of the ‘‘marginal value’’ foraging model. In the
model, each strategy is deployed in proportion to the ratio of
its payoff relative to the sum of the payoffs of all available
alternatives. Functionally, such a strategy, while failing to
maximise rate of return, may often approximate the optimal
strategy or at least avoid costly deviations from it. As
highlighted by other authors (McNamara and Houston
1987), more frequent deviations from the optimal policy
should be expected when their costs are smaller.
In Figure 6, we build on this assumption and on the ‘‘state’’
model proposed by Kacelnik and Marsh (2002; see also Marsh
et al. 2004) and extend it to illustrate the putative effects of
variations in state. We assume that repeated exposure to
treatments offering lower and higher objective intake rates
(corresponding to decoys DD and DA, respectively) causes
some correlated measure of state to be higher in the latter
case (Figure 6B). That is, state is assumed to be a positive
function of rate of intake during the period preceding the
choice itself. We then consider the improvement in state
produced by choosing either of the targets (FA and FD). The
difference between the improvement in state (DS) caused by
choosing FA over FD is the same under both treatments, but
Figure 5. Within-Treatments Comparison of Binary and Trinary Choice
Trials
The bars show the mean (6 s.e.) absolute (FD and FA) and relative
(FA*) proportion of choices for each option in the binary (white bars)
and trinary (black bars) trials for group NC (A and C) or group C (B
and D). Relative preferences were calculated using equation 1 (see
text). We compared the preference for the same options between the
binary and trinary contexts of the same treatment (when there are no
differential energetic effects). There were no violations of either
regularity or the constant-ratio rule (p . 0.1).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.g005
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beneﬁt is not linearly related to state. For the conditions
experienced by the starlings in our experiment (where
deprivation was very mild), it is reasonable to assume that
biological gains were a decreasing function of their initial
state (e.g., the contribution of a food item decreases with
increasing reserves; see also McNamara and Houston 1982).
Figure 6A illustrates this relationship. The ﬁgure shows that
the cost of choosing the target option with lower long-term
rate of energetic gain (FD) is more severe in treatment ‘‘Low
Intake’’ than in ‘‘High Intake’’ (jdDDj.jdDAj). Preference for
FA should thus be higher under treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ if
the frequency of choices for the leaner focal option is
inversely related to their cost. This model is consistent with
the equivalence between the effect of supplementary feeding
and that of the decoys.
From a mechanistic perspective, it is also possible that,
under conditions of higher energetic intake, animals are less
motivated to search and work for food. Our data support this
possibility. The time subjects took to start working once
presented with any option in no-choice trials (i.e., their
latency to ﬁrst peck) was signiﬁcantly longer in the treatment
‘‘High Intake’’ than in ‘‘Low Intake’’ in the experiment
without decoys (F1,8 = 24.6, p = 0.01) and in the experiment
with decoys, but only for the group of subjects for which
intake was not controlled (group NC: F1,4 = 39.3, p = 0.003;
compare this result to that for group C: F1,4 = 3.7, p = 0.13).
It is thus possible that these potential differences in motiva-
tional state led subjects to pay less attention to the
alternatives during a choice opportunity in the treatment
‘‘High Intake’’, resulting in the observed differences in
preference levels.
Within this framework, we now use two examples to
consider whether unwittingly induced changes in intake
between contexts could also underlie previously reported
ﬁndings of irrational behaviour.
Energetic State and Rationality in Jays
A recent study tested the effect of background context on
the foraging preferences of semi-tame food-hoarding grey
jays (Waite 2001a). The jays were initially split into two
groups, and each group was given 25 binary choices in only
one of two backgrounds: In background context A, the jays
had to choose between one and three raisins placed 0.5 m
inside separate tubes (where distance into the tubes should
correlate with perceived risk); in B, jays chose between two
identical options, each offering one raisin 0.5 m inside the
tubes. Both groups were subsequently presented with the
choice between one raisin 0.3 m into one tube and three
raisins 0.7 m into another tube. In violation of IIA, context
had an effect: Preference for the option offering more raisins
at a greater perceived risk was higher in the group that had
experienced context B, a result interpreted as consistent with
the existence of cognitive biases leading to departures from
value maximisation (Waite 2001a). However, experience with
the two background contexts and consequent differences in
amount of food hoarded (i.e., level of energy reserves for
future use) between groups could also have led to the
observed results. Those jays that had been in context A had
collected approximately 62 raisins, whereas those in context
B had collected an average of 25 raisins. Assuming that the
state of the jays was such that ﬁtness increased following a
decelerated function of accumulated raisins, it is possible that
those jays previously presented with lower food supplies had
more to gain by choosing the option yielding the larger
amount of food. Equating their hoards with energy reserves,
one could say that they were ‘‘hungrier’’ in context B and
hence afforded greater risks to pick the maximum reward.
This trade-off between energetic state and predation risk has
been extensively discussed within the behavioural ecology
literature (e.g., Houston and McNamara 1999)
Energetic State and Rationality in Hummingbirds
The comparison between binary and trinary choices
sometimes employed in studies designed to test economic
rationality in animal behaviour can also lead to changes in
state. For example, Bateson et al. (2002) compared prefer-
ences of Rufous hummingbirds (Selasphorus rufus) among three
ﬂower types differing in volume and concentration of sucrose
(target: 15 ll, 40% sucrose; competitor: 45 ll, 30%; decoy: 10
ll, 35%) in binary (target and competitor) and trinary (target,
competitor, and decoy) contexts. The birds experienced both
contexts consecutively. In each of them, they made repeated
choices between the available ﬂower types until a minimum
number of 150 choices for the target and competitor had
been reached. The strength of preferences for the competitor
over the target increased signiﬁcantly in the presence of the
decoy (trinary context), and the authors interpreted these
results as being inconsistent with the use of absolute
evaluation mechanisms as normally postulated by functional
Figure 6. A Functional Model of How State Can Affect Partial Preferences
(A) Fitness is plotted as a concave function of the organism’s state.
Exposure to DD leads to a poorer state (SdD) than that reached after
exposure to DA (SdA) (see also B). SdDþFD and SdDþFA denote the
state reached by subjects under treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ as a
consequence of choosing focal options FD and FA, respectively.
Similarly, SdA þ FD and SdA þ FA represent the state reached by
subjects in treatment ‘‘High Intake’’ after choosing FD and FA,
respectively.
(B) State is assumed to be a growing, linear function of energy intake.
DD and DA represent the average intake rates experienced by
subjects that include the decoys with the same names in their diet.
Although choosing FA is always better than choosing FD, and the
difference between the states caused by this choice is the same under
either treatment (SdD and SdA), the ﬁtness difference between
choosing FA and FD is higher under treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’ (dDD)
than ‘‘High Intake’’ (dDA). This should lead to a higher level of
preference for FA in the former treatment if choices of the low-
yielding option were to be reduced in proportion to their cost.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.g006
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have been caused by exposure to energetically different
contexts. Net rate of energy intake of the target, competitor,
and decoy were, respectively, 81.9, 92.0, and 59.5 J/s.
Considering, for instance, an average proportion of choices
for the decoy of about 20% (as described in the study),
subjects would necessarily experience a higher intake rate in
the binary than in the trinary context unless they modiﬁed
the relative allocation of responses. Therefore, if the interval
between consecutive foraging bouts did not differ systemati-
cally between contexts, cumulative gain along the 150 choices
would have been lower in the trinary context, favouring
preference for the option offering the higher net rate of
intake, as reported. Further analyses on the extent to which
state differed between contexts, testing for differences in
inter-bout intervals, variability in choices, and unplanned
differences in nutrient balance (i.e., in the actual volumes and
concentration of sugar and water; see, for example, Simpson
and Raubenheimer 1993) experienced in each context in this
and other experiments with hummingbirds (e.g., Bateson et
al. 2003) are therefore needed before concluding that the
results imply violations of rationality rather than compensa-
tions for differences in state generated by the introduction of
a decoy.
These examples were provided to illustrate that acknowl-
edging and controlling for the effects that differences
between choice sets may produce on an organism’s state is
paramount when investigating the inﬂuence of context on
choice behaviour. This is particularly important because it is
often difﬁcult to predict how changes in state will affect
preferences. For instance, our results showed a higher level of
preference for the larger but more delayed reward when the
starlings were under a poorer schedule—a result also
previously reported by some authors (Christensen-Szalanski
et al. 1980; Rechten et al. 1983). Conversely, results showing
an effect of state in the opposite direction have also been
reported in the literature and interpreted as demonstrating
greater impulsivity under hungrier conditions (Snyderman
1983; Lucas et al. 1993). From a functional viewpoint, whether
lowering energetic state should shift preference towards
bigger and later rewards over smaller and more immediate
ones or vice versa depends on the details of the problem.
While many authors dealing with the problem of temporal
discounting focus on one-shot choices, animal experiments
are conducted in repeated trials, where delays mean lost
opportunity, and where consideration of variance (‘‘risk’’)
must come into the picture. For example, when the pressing
factor is maximisation of rate of intake, greater ITIs have two
effects: They alter the state of the subjects (lowering their
energy reserves), and they shift the difference in long-term
rates in favour of larger, more delayed rewards (a result that
may mistakenly be considered a decrease in impulsivity). On
the other hand, when risk is the main factor, it is impossible
to make a general prediction, because the consequences of
variance in both size and delay to reward are functionally
sensitive to the curvature of the ﬁtness versus state function,
and this is likely to have one or more inﬂexion points.
Because the directionality of state effects under biologically
rational choice is difﬁcult to predict, to demonstrate the
presence of true breaches of rationality or to conﬁrm
previous ﬁndings as evidence of irrationality using these
experimental economics paradigms, it is therefore essential
not only to investigate the immediate effects of state on
preference, but also to ensure that these violations are
reproduced and not altered in any direction when state is
controlled. Additionally, the observation that rewards re-
ceived under higher states of need often lead to faster
acquisition (Capaldi and Havancik 1973; Tarpy and Mayer
1978; Balleine 1992) makes it fundamental to control for
Table 1. Between- and Within-Treatments Comparison of Binary and Trinary Choice Trials for Group NC
Choice Context Compared Option Predicted Direction of Preference Breach of IIA? Figure
Between-treatment
comparisons
Bin (Low Int) 3 Trin (High Int) FD FD (Bin:Low Int) , FD (Trin:High Int) Regularity 4A
FA FA (Bin:Low Int) . FA (Trin:High Int) N 4A
FA* FA (Bin:Low Int) . FA* (Trin:High Int) Constant-ratio rule 4A
Bin (High Int) 3 Trin (Low Int) FD FD (Bin:High Int) . FD (Trin:Low Int) N 4C
FA FA (Bin:High Int) , FA (Trin:Low Int) Regularity 4C
FA* FA (Bin:High Int) , FA* (Trin:Low Int) Constant-ratio rule 4C
Within-treatments
comparisons
Bin (Low Int) 3 Trin (Low Int) FD FD (Bin:Low Int) = FD (Trin:Low Int) N 5A
FA FA (Bin:Low Int) = FA (Trin:Low Int) N 5A
FA* FA (Bin:Low Int) = FA* (Trin:Low Int) N 5A
Bin (High Int) 3 Trin (High Int) FD FD (Bin:High Int) = FD (Trin:High Int) N 5C
FA FA (Bin:High Int) = FA (Trin:High Int) N 5C
FA* FA (Bin:High Int) = FA*(Trin:High Int) N 5C
All predictions are based on the results of the experiments without decoys, which showed that preference for FA was higher in the treatment with lower accumulated intake,
that is, P(FA[Low Intake]) . P(FA[High Intake]), and conversely P(FD[Low Intake]) , P(FD[High Intake]), and assume that differences in intake generated by exposure to the
decoys is the sole cause of difference in preferences between treatments.
‘‘FA*’’ indicates preference for FA relative to FD in the trinary choice trial, calculated as shown in equation 1 (see text).
Bin, binary; F(int.), P(F[Intake]); Int, intake; N, no breach, Trin, trinary
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020402.t001
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properties of the rewards.
Conclusion
Following the growing body of claims for irrational choice
behaviour by human subjects, recent reports on breaches of
rationality in animals may be interpreted as questioning the
predictive power of the optimality approach in behavioural
ecology, favouring the view that the reported inconsistencies
result from rigid rules of evaluation and choice leading to the
assignment of context-dependent values to options and
devaluing the contribution of functional reasoning. We do
not doubt that the precise empirical description of decision
rules is important. Indeed, ﬁndings of locally irrational
behaviour are useful tools for the investigation of the
mechanisms underlying choices, often forcing a reinterpre-
tation of existing data and models of optimal decision-
making. Additionally, the potential dependence of valuation
mechanisms on the context of choice might have direct
implications for other biological systems. For example, Shaﬁr
et al. (2003) have recently emphasised the role of pollinator
perception and choice strategies in mediating the evolution
of ﬂoral nectar distribution strategies, as well as the potential
use of knowledge of cognition-mediated mechanisms of
choice on the development of biological control programs.
Still, if ideas are going to travel safely between economics and
biology, crucial details of the experimental paradigms must
be scrutinised, and differences between human and nonhu-
man research must be acknowledged. Here we emphasise
that, due to the need of exposing animals to the contingencies
of the choice problem, contextual changes may lead to
variations in the state of individuals, which in turn can affect
both the amount of knowledge acquired by subjects and the
parameters of the decision faced by the individuals, thus
calling into question the signiﬁcance of apparent violations
of rational axioms.
We do not claim that state dependence accounts for all
reported inconsistencies in animal choice (e.g., Waite 2001b;
Shaﬁr et al. 2002), nor are we suggesting that animal choices
are based directly upon calculations of optimal state-depend-
ent actions instead of direct psychological mechanisms of
choice. Indeed, the notion of ‘‘rules of thumb’’ that perform
well in most relevant ecological situations, but may also lead
to suboptimal behaviour, has been long accepted in behav-
ioural and evolutionary biology, and may well also comprise
some of the comparative mechanisms of choice and ‘‘fast and
frugal’’ heuristics previously described for human beings (e.g.,
Gigerenzer et al. 1999). However, we believe that if
evolutionarily inspired normative models of behaviour are
to be treated fairly, a deep scrutiny of the causes underlying
observations of apparent economic irrationality in animal
(and, for that matter, human) choices should be attempted.
Economic theory has been and still is a source of inspiration
for optimality theorising in biology, and experimental
economics may just as well inspire understanding of the
predictive failure of some of these models. Conversely, the
systematic observation of local cases of irrationality in
animals may provide insights into the nature of the
mechanisms of choice employed by humans. However, our
study highlights that at least some apparent similarities in the
expression of ‘‘maladaptive’’ behaviours may be due to
oversights in the implementation of experiments testing
ideas that originate in other disciplines.
Materials and Methods
Our main experiment consisted of training starlings to choose
between either three or two simultaneously presented foraging
options. Each option was implemented as a coloured, intermittently
ﬂashing key that, when pecked once by the subject, caused the other
keys to darken, stopped ﬂashing, and then delivered a certain amount
of food following the ﬁrst peck after a programmed delay. The
amount and delay to food determined the features of each option. In
total, there were four options in the experiment, two forming a ‘‘focal
pair’’ of target options and two that were called ‘‘decoys’’.
Parameters of the options. The actual reward parameters
corresponding to the four options are shown in Figure 1. The two
focal options, FA and FD, offered a ratio of amount of reward to
delay to reward of 0.5 food units per second, while each of the two
decoys, DA and DD, offered a ratio of 0.25 units per second (the
slopes of the solid lines in Figure 1). We call these ratios ‘‘short-term
rates’’ for consistency with previous literature (viz., Bateson and
Kacelnik 1996). Short-term rate is known to be strongly correlated to
attractiveness, but it is not a description of objective intake rate,
because it does not include times other than the delay between choice
and outcome. This difference is important and underlies this study.
Functional approaches to foraging behaviour, such as classical
optimal foraging theory (Stephens and Krebs 1986), have highlighted
that energetic gains are a function of total intake over total time. This
relationship is expressed by deﬁning the value of an option by its real
rate of returns as given by A/(D þ ITI), where A is food amount, D is
the delay between choice and outcome, and ITI, is the sum of all other
times in the foraging cycle. This expression, known as ‘‘long-term
rate’’, is the slope of the broken lines in Figure 1. Any consideration
of the effect of energy state on preferences must consider long-term
rate, even if the subjects used only short-term rates to form
preferences. Scholars concerned with the mechanisms by which
stimuli acquire signiﬁcance (and hence potential attractiveness) to a
learning animal, such as the behavioural analysis and conditioning
literatures, have focused on the conditions that make the association
between the outcome and the predictive event easier. In this case, the
predictive event is the onset of the stimulus marking the delay to
food, which coincides with the animal’s action of pecking at it (Green
et al. 1981; Kacelnik 1984; Mazur 1987; Bateson and Kacelnik 1996).
We programmed the alternatives so that the two focal options were
as close as possible to being equally attractive and superior to the two
decoys, themselves equated in short-term rate. At the same time, we
used the fact that the energetic consequences of the two decoys are
very different to manipulate energetic consequences.
The parameters of the decoys were chosen to maximise their
putative cognitive effect on preferences between the focal options.
Several accounts of the effect of poorer alternatives have proposed
that they may have an effect because decision-makers compare each
attribute of the options (in our case amount and delay) independ-
ently, not integrated into a single expression of value. In the
conditions described by Figure 1, two putative mechanisms could
cause DA to increase preference for FA. One of them, referred to as
the comparative model (Shaﬁr et al. 1989; Wedell 1991; Shaﬁr et al.
1993; Tversky and Simonson 1993), postulates that DA could favour
FA by means of its asymmetric relationship of dominance (with
dominance used as a synonym for superiority) with the focal options.
The overall idea is that an option gains value when it is better than
other options in the set along a particular attribute. In the present
case, DA is dominated by FA in one attribute (delay) and equal in the
other (amount), but it is dominated by FD in one attribute (delay)
while it dominates it in the other (amount). Thus, if subjects are
inﬂuenced by the number of relationships of dominance between
attributes, FA could be more attractive than FD for being the only
option that dominates DA completely. A second mechanism of
interest, known as the ‘‘range effect’’, says that the same difference in
a physical attribute can have a greater effect when embedded in a
narrower range of values (Parducci 1965). Therefore, the quantitative
advantage of an option along a given attribute decreases as a function
of the range of values present. For example, if only FA and FD are
present, the range of delays is 6 s, and FD’s advantage is 100%. When,
say, DA is added, the range increases to 16 s, and FD’s advantage over
FA is only 37.5% of the total range. Since the range in amounts is not
modiﬁed by adding DA, this again may favour FA. The same two
mechanisms could make DD enhance the attractiveness of FD over
FA. Note, however, that although these mechanisms provide a
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observed, changes in preference levels between contexts are usually
interpreted as being compatible with context dependence regardless
of their direction and the number of attributes describing the
options (Hurly and Oseen 1999; Bateson 2002; Bateson et al. 2002).
Subjects. Subjects were 28 naı ¨ve starlings captured in Oxford
(English Nature licence # 20020068). After capture, the birds were
kept outdoors and, during the experiment, transferred to individual
indoor cages (120 cm 3 60 cm 3 50 cm) that served as housing and
testing chambers. Lights were on between 0500 and 1900 h, and
temperature ranged from 12 8Ct o1 68C. Subjects were visually but
not acoustically isolated. The experiments took place between June
and October 2002.
Apparatus. Each cage had a panel with a central food hopper and
three response keys. Computers running Arachnid language (Paul
Fray, Cambridge, UK) served for control and data collection. Rewards
were units of Orlux pellets, crushed and sieved to an even size (0.025
6 0.005 g). Automatic pellet dispensers (Campden Instruments,
Leicester, UK) delivered rewards at a rate of 1 unit/s. Each option was
signalled by a different key colour (red, green, yellow, blue, white, or
pink).
Experimental protocol. Subjects were ﬁrst trained to peck at keys
to obtain rewards until all birds pecked at least 80% of the food
opportunities. A discrete trials procedure with two types of trials (no-
choice and choice) was then employed. No-choice trials provided the
birds information about each alternative, but also contributed to
their rate of intake. These trials started with one key blinking. The
ﬁrst peck caused the light to stay steadily on. The ﬁrst peck after the
programmed delay had elapsed triggered the delivery of the
programmed amount of food, followed by a ﬁxed ITI of 60 s, during
which all keys were off. Since food was delivered following the ﬁrst
peck after the end of the designated delay, experienced delays were
slightly longer than those programmed (median [interquartile range]
in experiment with decoys: treatment ‘‘Low Intake’’, delay FD = 4.1 s
[0.2 s], delay FA = 10.2 s [2.0 s], delay DD = 4.1 s [0.2 s]; treatment
‘‘High Intake’’, delay FD = 4.1 s [0.2 s], delay FA = 10.2 s [1.8 s], decoy
DD = 20.2 s [0.3 s]).
Choice trials began with two or three keys (depending on whether
choice was binary or trinary) simultaneously blinking. The ﬁrst peck
on any of them caused the pecked key to turn steadily on and the
others to turn off. After that, the trial continued as in no-choice
trials. The order and sides in which the options were presented was
randomised. After the sessions, subjects were fed ad libitum with
turkey crumbs for at least 2 h, then supplemented with ten
mealworms, and then food deprived until the beginning of the
experimental sessions on the following morning.
In all experiments (except the calibration for discrimination of
amounts) we used a within-subjects design with two treatments. The
within-subjects design was preferred owing to the high level of
variability between individual starlings’ energetic requirements,
which would have prevented accurate control of energetic state
between groups. We therefore focus our analyses on within-subjects
comparisons, since variations in the energetic state of subjects
between groups of different subjects would hinder the comparison of
their preference levels. The pairing of options with colours was
balanced across subjects and changed between treatments. Treatment
order was balanced across birds. Subjects were given one resting day
with ad libitum food between treatments. Each treatment lasted for
20 sessions. Data from the last ﬁve sessions were used for analyses.
Discrimination of amounts. In the discrimination experiment, we
used a between-subjects design with six male starlings, split into two
groups of three birds each. Group 1 chose between 1 and 2 units of
food, and group 2 chose between 2 and 5 units. Rewards were
delivered after the ﬁrst peck on the corresponding key. Subjects
experienced two sessions per day, at 0800 and 1300 h. Each session
consisted of 84 trials, divided into 21 blocks of four trials each: two
no-choice (each option presented once) followed by two choice trials.
Effects of intake rate on choice without decoys. To investigate the
potential effect of different intake rates on preference between the
target options, we used ten birds (ﬁve males and ﬁve females) in a
within-subjects design with two treatments, which differed with
respect to the amount of supplementary food delivered to the
starlings. One of the treatments simulated the intake effect (total
amount of food consumed) of experience with decoy DA (treatment
‘‘High Intake’’) on 25% of the foraging opportunities (this propor-
tion was established from the average proportion of trials in which
the decoy was experienced in a pilot study). The other treatment
simulated the intake effect of experience with decoy DD (treatment
‘‘Low Intake’’) on 25% of all foraging opportunities. To achieve this
we delivered unconditionally the reward corresponding to the
appropriate decoy once per experimental block (details below), after
the ITI that followed the last trial of that block. Unlike the trials with
the pair of focal options, no action was needed on the part of the
subjects to receive the unconditional reward, nor was any speciﬁc
discriminative stimulus associated with it.
There were three daily sessions, at 0600, 1000, and 1400 h. Each
session consisted of 36 trials, grouped into 12 blocks of three trials
each. Each block started with two no-choice trials (each focal option
once), followed by an ITI and an unconditional food delivery in which
the amount of the simulated decoy was delivered after the delay
corresponding to that decoy had elapsed. The third and last trial of
each block was a choice between the two focal options.
Test of economic rationality in the presence and absence of
controls for intake. Twelve birds were randomly assigned to two
groups (intake controlled, or group C, and intake not controlled, or
group NC) of six birds each (three males and three females in each
group). All subjects experienced two treatments, one with decoy DA
(treatment ‘‘High Intake’’) and another with DD (treatment ‘‘Low
Intake’’). In group C, the differences in intake rate between
treatments caused by the exposure to the energetically different
decoys were eliminated with supplementary feeding.
Three daily sessions started at 0500, 0900, and 1400 h. Each session
consisted of 63 trials, grouped into seven blocks of nine trials each:
three no-choice trials followed by six choice trials in a random order
(two trinary choices, two binary choices between the focal options,
and two binary choices between each focal and the decoy). To
equalise intake between treatments in group C, we adopted the
following procedure. We calculated the maximum obtainable amount
of food and delay per block for treatment ‘‘High Intake’’ (the
treatment offering the higher cumulative delay and amount), and in
both treatments delivered supplementary rewards up to this amount
and delay twice per block. Thus, in every block of trials we equalised
intake and total time to the same value in both treatments. The
supplement was delivered after the fourth and the ninth trial of each
block, after adding the appropriate delay to the ITI. In both
treatments, supplements in the middle of the block were followed
by a 5-min no-food interval to prevent satiation. Blocks were
separated by 10-min intervals.
Data analysis. According to the principle of IIA, the strength of
preference between two options should be independent of the
presence of other (less preferred) options. These other options may
either form part of the general situational background and be absent
at the time of the choice, or form part of an enriched set of options at
choice time. To test whether differences in background led to
breaches of IIA, we compared choice proportions in binary choices
(in which the two target options of the focal pair were paired)
between the two treatments by conducting separate tests for each
group of subjects. To test the temporal effects of potential state
changes over the trials in the experimental sessions (i.e., whether the
strength of preference between the focal options changed along a
session), we calculated the slope of the regression of trial number
against (transformed; see below) proportion of choices for FA over
FD and tested whether the group of slopes was different between
treatments for both groups of subjects.
We also tested for differences in preference between the focal
options across contexts, comparing binary with trinary choice trials.
We performed two analyses. First, we tested whether the relative
strength of preference between the focal options differed between







where p(FA,FD;fFA,FD,Dg) is the relative preference for FA over FD
when the alternatives indicated inside the curly brackets were
present, and n(FA;fFA,FD,Dg) is the number of choices for FA within
the same set of alternatives. D stands for either of the decoys (DA or
DD). The second term in the denominator follows the same notation.
According to a strong probabilistic version of IIA known as the
constant-ratio rule (Luce 1959), relative preferences should be the
same between binary and trinary contexts.
Second, we compared absolute strength of preference for each of
the targets between the two contexts to test for violations of
regularity. Regularity is a weaker form of IIA (Luce and Suppes
1965), which asserts that the absolute proportion of choices for an
option cannot increase when a new option is added to the choice set.
Again, breaches of regularity are usually taken as strong evidence that
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Schuck-Paim and Kacelnik [2002] for an intuitive explanation).
We used repeated-measures ANOVA on square-root arcsine–
transformed choice proportions, having treatment and order as
within- and between-subjects factors, respectively. In all cases we
tested the effect of order and interaction between the factors, but
neither was signiﬁcant. The assumptions of normality and homoge-
neity of variances were not violated for any of the transformed
datasets. The Greenhouse-Geiser correction was applied whenever
the assumption of sphericity was violated. Tests were always two-
tailed. In all conditions, we additionally tested whether the birds’
preferences were already stable when the experimental sessions were
interrupted. We considered preferences to be stable when the
regression of choice proportions (for the focal choice pair in binary
choices, where only FA and FD were available) in ﬁve consecutive
sessions (against session number) was not signiﬁcant and the standard
deviation of these proportions did not exceed 0.20.
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